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EXTENDED SHAREHOLDER LIABILITY FOR
SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS
ALESSANDRO ROMANO,* LUCA ENRIQUES,** & JONATHAN R. MACEY***
Regulators generally have tried to address the problems posed by the excessive
risk-taking of Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) by placing
restrictions on the activities in which SIFIs engage. However, the complexity of
these institutions makes such attempts necessarily imperfect. This Article
proposes to address the problem at its very source, which is the incentives that
SIFI owners have to push for excessive risk-taking by managers. Building on the
traditional rule of “double liability,” we propose to modify the current (general)
rule limiting the liability of SIFI shareholders to the amount of their initial
investments in such companies. We propose replacing the extant limited liability
regime with a new system that imposes additional liability over and above what
SIFI shareholders already have invested in a preset amount that varies with a
SIFI’s centrality in the financial network. Our liability regime has a number of
advantages. First, by increasing shareholder exposure to downside risk, it
discourages excessive risk-taking. At the same time, by placing a clearly defined
ceiling on shareholders’ total liability exposure, it will not obliterate shareholders’
incentives to invest in the ﬁrst place. Second, the liability to which shareholders
are exposed is carefully tailored to the level of systemic risk that their institution
creates. Thus, our rule induces shareholders to account for the negative
externality SIFIs can impose without unduly stifling such financial institutions’
role within the financial system and in the wider economy. Third, as the amount
of liability is clearly defined ex ante using the rigorous tools of network theory,
our rule minimizes the influence of interest groups and the impact of
idiosyncratic government decisions. Last, as markets know in advance the
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amount of liability to which shareholders are exposed, our rule favors the
creation of a vibrant insurance and derivative market so that the risk of SIFIs
defaults can be allocated to those who can better bear it.
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INTRODUCTION
The default of a systemically important financial institution (SIFI)
imposes significant negative externalities.1 Such a default inevitably
propagates through the financial system with dramatic and fatal
consequences for even the most prudently run businesses. It is understood
that the risk of a national or global economic meltdown attributable to the
failure of a systemically important financial institution justifies aggressive
regulation as well as significant departure from ordinary and customary
corporate governance norms for SIFIs.2 Perhaps the most telling
manifestation of the public policy implications of being considered
systemically important is the entrenched policy of governments around the
world to bail out financially distressed SIFIs, despite the massive costs and
perverse incentives associated with these bailouts. No one has devised a
functional plan to enable governments credibly to commit to refrain
from carrying out such bailouts.3
1. See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT:
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES xviii–xix (2011) (arguing that one of the main
causes of the 2007 financial crisis was SIFIs’ excessive risk-taking).
2. See FIN. STABILITY BD., THEMATIC REVIEW ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 3 (2017),
https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/Thematic-Review-on-CorporateGovernance.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZB6Q-87N4] (noting that jurisdictions routinely
impose additional limitations to the activities of systemically important financial
institutions); see also BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
PRINCIPLES FOR BANKS 6 (2015), https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d328.pdf [https://
perma.cc/L55G-9FTQ] (“SIFIs are expected to have in place the corporate governance
structure and practices commensurate with their role in and potential impact on
national and global financial stability.”).
3. For instance, the Dodd-Frank Act was introduced with the specific goal of
putting an end to bailouts. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank]; see Stephen J.
Lubben & Arthur E. Jr. Wilmarth, Too Big and Unable to Fail, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1205, 1205
(2017) (“The explicit goal of [the Dodd-Frank Act] is to enable a SIFI to fail . . . .”).
However, the broad consensus is that the Dodd-Frank has failed to achieve this goal
and it might even have backfired. See Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance
Reform in Post-Crisis Financial Firms: Two Fundamental Tensions, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. 959, 961
(2018) (“[T]he predominant bank holding companies remain so large and so
complex that the legislative claim to have statutorily foreclosed future bailouts lacks
credibility.”); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate
Response to the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 954 (2011) (discussing the
“fundamental weaknesses in the financial regulatory systems”). See generally Roberta
Romano, Dodd-Frank’s Regulatory Morass, REG. REV., Nov. 10, 2014,
http://www.theregreview.org/2o14/11/10/romano-dodd-frank-consequences
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It is well known that the near certainty that SIFIs will be bailed out creates
acute moral hazard.4 Specifically, SIFI creditors, shareholders, directors,
and managers, knowing that their firm will be bailed out if too many risky
investments turn out badly, have incentives to take excessive risk5 and
refrain from engaging in monitoring.6 To inhibit such excessive risk-taking,
policymakers consistently pledge that there will be “no more tax-funded
bailouts.”7 But such pledges are unconvincing because, unlike Ulysses,
[https://perma.cc/38SD-7VH2] (reporting the widely held belief that the Dodd-Frank Act
“has not resolved the ‘too-big-to-fail’ syndrome. In fact, it could well exacerbate it”).
4. See, e.g., HEIDI MANDANIS SCHOONER & MICHAEL W. TAYLOR, GLOBAL BANK
REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 60 (2010); Jonathan R. Macey, Commercial
Banking and Democracy: The Illusive Quest for Deregulation, 23 YALE J. REG. 1 (2006); Saule
T. Omarova, The “Too Big To Fail” Problem, 103 MINN. L. REV. 2495, 2500 (2019) (“The
well-known notion of ‘moral hazard’ captures the economic inefficiencies associated
with this implicit subsidy: large firms shielded from the negative consequences of their
risk-taking have an incentive to take greater risks than they otherwise would.”).
5. The term “excessive” is defined with respect to social welfare. See Steven L.
Schwarcz & Aleaha Jones, Corporate Governance of SIFI Risk-Taking: An International
Research Agenda, CROSS-BORDER BANK RESOL. (forthcoming 2017–18).
From a traditional corporate governance perspective, risk-taking would be
considered excessive if it has a negative expected value to the firm and its
investors—primarily the shareholders. . . . From a broader perspective,
however, “excessive” risk-taking might also take into account societal
consequences. One of us has argued that—at least for SIFIs—traditional
corporate governance misaligns corporate interests and societal interests, and
that any assessment of SIFI risk-taking should also take into account systemic
externalities that could harm the public.
Id.
6. Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 490 (2011) (“[I]f either
or both creditors and shareholders of such a TBTF [too-big-to-fail] institution believe
they will be made whole in a bailout—or not bear all the losses—they will have a
reduced incentive to monitor the [TBTF] institution’s risk-taking, and they will not
demand as great of a risk premium when they extend credit.”). But see Steven L
Schwarcz, Too Big To Fool: Moral Hazard, Bailouts, and Corporate Responsibility, 102 MINN.
L. REV. 761, 765 (2017) (“There is no evidence, much less proof, that [too-big-to-fail]
causes firms to engage in morally hazardous behavior. Most studies discussing such
behavior merely assume it without actually offering evidence.”).
7. See Transcript of President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at Signing
of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-signingdodd-frank-wall-street-reform-and-consumer-protection-act
[https://perma.cc/2QXV-4CRL]. President Obama stated:
[B]ecause of this law, the American people will never again be asked to foot
the bill for Wall Street’s mistakes. There will be no more tax-funded bailoutsperiod. If a large financial institution should ever fail, this reform gives us the
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regulators and politicians cannot credibly tie themselves to the mast.8
Bailouts are therefore a fact of life.9
Regulators generally have tried to mitigate SIFIs’ proclivity to engage
in excessive risk-taking by imposing strict capital requirements and
placing restrictions on the activities in which SIFIs can engage.10 Yet,
the high costs and sheer complexity of these regulations make such
attempts necessarily imperfect.11 This Article proposes an important
new addition to these standard regulatory approaches by addressing
the problem at its very source, which is the market-based incentives
that SIFI owners have to encourage and incentivize excessive risktaking by managers. Our proposal is to modify the current practice of
limiting the liability of SIFI shareholders to the amount of their
investment in such companies.
We propose replacing the extant limited liability regime with a new
system that imposes a fixed and stable amount of potential additional
liability, over and above what SIFI shareholders already have invested, in
case the SIFI is resolved or bailed out. By increasing shareholder
exposure to downside risk, our proposal strongly discourages excessive
ability to wind it down without endangering the broader economy. And there
will be new rules to make clear that no firm is somehow protected because it
is “too big to fail.”
Id.
8. Levitin, supra note 6, at 439 (footnote omitted). Professor Levitin argues:
Law is an insufficient commitment device for avoiding bailouts altogether. It
is impossible to produce binding commitment to a preset resolution process,
irrespective of the results. The financial Ulysses cannot be bound to the mast.
Although we may want Ulysses to be bound to the mast when the sailing is
smooth to avoid the sirens’ call of politically directed state intervention in the
market, the situation changes once the ship has hit the rocks. Once the ship
is foundering, we do not want Ulysses to be bound to the mast, lest go down
[sic] with the ship and drown. Instead, we want to be sure his hands are free
to bail. The question then, is not whether to have bailouts but how bailouts
should be structured.
Id.
9. See Peter Conti-Brown, Elective Shareholder Liability, 64 STAN. L. REV. 409, 423–25
(2012) (discussing the impossibility of “Never Again” for bailouts).
10. See, e.g., Alexander W. Salter, Vipin Veetil & Lawrence H. White, Extended
Shareholder Liability as a Means to Constrain Moral Hazard in Insured Banks, 63 Q. REV.
ECON. & FIN. 153, 153 (2017).
11. Thomas Hoenig, the former vice chairman of the FDIC and the former
President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, noted that “[t]he problem is not
that banks take risk, but that some are too complex for anyone to assess and control
that risk.” Thomas Hoenig, Why the Sign Must Say: No UBS in the USA, FIN. TIMES, June
16, 2011, at 11.
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risk-taking. At the same time, by placing a fixed ceiling on shareholders’
total liability exposure, it will not eradicate shareholders’ incentives to
invest in the first place.12 The advantage of our approach is that, by
realigning shareholders’ incentives to reduce SIFI risk-taking to more
societally acceptable levels, it provides a measured and proportionate
complement to existing, highly imperfect regulatory initiatives to reduce
excessive risk-taking. Thus, our approach is unique in that it will create
an operating environment in which bankers with properly aligned
incentives will voluntarily engage in societally beneficial self-discipline
and avoid excessive risk-taking in the first place.
The legal regime of extended liability that we propose for SIFIs is
different from both unlimited and “classic” limited liability systems.
Under the former, which is traditionally the rule for general partners in
partnerships, partners are liable for the partnership’s unsatisfied debts,
whether deriving from contractual obligations or torts, with no cap on the
amount of the liability.13 In the classic limited liability system, which has
been the rule for corporations in the last couple of centuries,
shareholders are not liable for any of the unpaid corporate debts.14
Hence, their loss is limited to their investment in the company if it goes
bankrupt.15 Extended liability is located in between these two extremes
because shareholders stand to lose more than their investment in the
company, but their downside exposure is still capped at a preset amount.
The main claim of this Article is that, for SIFIs, a carefully crafted
extended liability regime is superior to both unlimited and traditional
limited liability. To be clear, we do not argue that an extended liability rule
can induce shareholders to internalize all the possible externalities caused
by the distress of a SIFI. As we argue in Section II.B, this result is both
impossible to achieve under any liability rule and undesirable. Instead, the
more modest goal of our rule is neutralizing the moral hazard created
by the expectation of SIFI bailouts.

12. Bainbridge and Henderson note that “there is considerable truth to the widely
shared view that limited liability was, and remains, essential to attracting the enormous
amount of investment capital necessary for industrial corporations to arise and
flourish.” See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE & M. TODD HENDERSON, LIMITED LIABILITY: A
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 50–51 (2016). In Section II.B, we argue that unlimited
liability would lead to overdeterrence and shrink the size of the financial sector beyond
what is optimal.
13. See, e.g., ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 6–7 (1986) (describing the liability
regime for general partners).
14. Id. at 7.
15. Id.
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Extended liability has a long and illustrious tradition in the United
States. For roughly three quarters of a century, shareholders of banks
faced a rule of “double liability,” which made them liable for more than
they had invested in the bank.16 Scholars, including one of us with
Geoffrey Miller, have argued that it is important to investigate “whether
double liability—or some variant on the idea—offers promise for coping
with contemporary problems in the banking industry.”17 We return to this
question showing that the current features of the financial system
(namely, the presence of capital ratios for financial institutions, the
dominance of institutional share ownership, and the availability of welldeveloped insurance and derivatives markets) create the perfect
conditions for implementing a special form of extended liability. Against
this background, the argument advanced in this Article is then articulated
in four steps. First, limited liability is inadequate for SIFIs. Second, due to
the specific features of SIFIs, it is possible to avoid the theoretical and
practical shortcomings that are usually associated with extending
shareholder liability. Third, unlimited shareholder liability for SIFIs would
be inefficient. Fourth, a carefully designed, “network-sensitive” rule of
extended liability would outperform both limited and unlimited liability.
The structure of the Article is as follows. Part I explains why it is
important to ensure that systemically important financial institutions
do not engage in excessive risk-taking. Moreover, this part sketches the
proposals that have been advanced by the literature to increase
shareholders’ liability, and hence reduce their risk propensity. Part II
explains why the traditional limited liability rule and a regime of
unlimited liability for shareholders are both undesirable for SIFIs. Part
III is the core of the Article and describes in detail the liability rule that
we propose. Part IV tries to anticipate the effect that our liability rule
would have on equity markets and SIFI ownership. Part V shows how
traditional objections to unlimited shareholder liability either do not
apply to our proposed rule or can be easily addressed and outlines how
shareholders of SIFIs transitioning to the proposed regime could be
compensated for the losses it imposes on them. Part VI briefly
concludes by summarizing the main findings of the Article.

16. For a discussion of double liability, see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Double
Liability of Bank Shareholders: History and Implications, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31, 31 (1992).
17. Id. at 62.
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I. THE CHALLENGE OF TAMING SIFIS
To begin our analysis, we start by explaining why policymakers still face
a serious challenge in providing for an effective regulatory framework for
tackling SIFIs and their tendency to engage in excessive risk-taking. Next,
we briefly review previous proposals to dispense with shareholder limited
liability. We cover both general recommendations in that direction,
namely Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman’s proposal to make
shareholders liable towards tort creditors,18 and the more recent, postcrisis suggestions to extend shareholder liability with respect to (some)
financial institutions, explaining why each of them would be
inadequate as a tool to prevent SIFIs’ excessive risk-taking. We also
discuss the double shareholder liability regime which applied to banks
for a considerable period of U.S. history.
A. SIFIs and Interconnections Within the Financial Network
The recent financial crisis has been a stunning reminder of the fragility
of the financial system. As its various parts are increasingly intertwined,
large shocks can quickly propagate throughout the financial system and
to the real economy with catastrophic consequences.19 National and
supranational policymakers reacted by tightening up the regulatory
framework with the aim of minimizing the risk of future financial crises.20
The main targets of these regulations have been so-called systemically
important financial institutions (SIFIs), that is, banks and other
financial institutions—the failure of which, due to their size and
interconnectedness, can bring down the entire financial system.21
Describing the new regulatory framework lies outside the scope of
this Article,22 but two facts are worth mentioning. First, policymakers
18. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability
for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1880 (1990).
19. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the
Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 797, 847 (2011)
(defining systemic risk as “the risk that a localized economic shock can have worldwide
repercussions because of the interconnections between financial institutions”); Steven
L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 199 (2008).
20. See, e.g., Daniel K. Tarullo, Financial Regulation: Still Unsettled a Decade After the
Crisis, 33 J. ECON. PERSP. 61, 64–70 (2019).
21. In fact, the Dodd-Frank Act states, in its preamble, that one of its primary objectives
is ending the too-big-to-fail problem. See Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2012)) (stating that the Dodd-Frank intends to “to end ‘too
big to fail,’ [and] to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts”).
22. For an excellent introduction, see generally DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL:
UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES (2011).
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have significantly expanded the portfolio of regulatory tools to
preserve financial stability. Before the crisis, most of the regulations
aimed at ensuring the solvency of the individual financial institutions
without paying attention to the interconnections among them.23
Departing from this “microprudential” approach, policymakers have
now introduced a new family of “macroprudential” policies that
attempt to protect the financial system as a whole.24 These new policies
have significantly complicated the regulatory landscape25 and yet have
not eliminated the risk of a systemic crisis. Regardless of how carefully
they are devised, ex ante regulations—be they micro or macro—
cannot eliminate systemic risk: “[f]ailure is a fact of economic life.”26
Moreover, regulators suffer from a chronic lack of information that
impairs their ability to produce effective policies.27 For instance, leading
financial economists have suggested that the capital requirements for

23. See Samuel G. Hanson et al., A Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation,
25 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 3 (2011) (describing a microprudential approach as “one in which
regulation is . . . aimed at preventing the costly failure of individual financial
institutions”). See generally MICHAEL S. BARR ET AL., FINANCIAL REGULATION: LAW AND
POLICY 310 (2d ed. 2018) (arguing that one of the main problems of the capital
requirements that were imposed before the crisis was that they did not account for the
interconnectedness of financial institutions).
24. See Kristin N. Johnson, Macroprudential Regulation: A Sustainable Approach to
Regulating Financial Markets, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 881, 881 (2013) (arguing that “the
culture of financial institutions may lead [a] Board to govern these businesses less
effectively than boards in non-financial sectors”). See generally Ben Bernanke,
Implementing a Macroprudential Approach to Supervision and Regulation, Remarks
at the 47th Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, (May 5, 2011), in
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20110505a.htm
[https://perma.cc/P58X-KWCS], at 1 (explaining that the post-crisis legislation
requires “the Federal Reserve and other financial regulatory agencies adopt a so-called
macroprudential approach . . . [that] supplements traditional supervision and
regulation of individual firms or markets with explicit consideration of threats to the
stability of the financial system as a whole”).
25. As noted by Daniel Tarullo, a former member of the Board of Governors of
the United States Federal Reserve Board, the Dodd-Frank Act alone “called for literally
hundreds of new regulations, an approach that entailed protracted and often
complicated rulemakings.” Tarullo, supra note 20, at 70.
26. Levitin, supra note 6, at 478 (crises are bound to occur in complex, tightlycoupled systems, such as the financial system); see Iman Anabtawi & Steven L.
Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address the Inevitability of Financial Failure,
92 TEX. L. REV. 75, 102 (2013); see also YAIR LISTOKIN, LAW AND MACROECONOMICS 6
(2019) (“[E]ven the best financial regulation is doomed to periodic failure.”).
27. See, e.g., JOHN ARMOUR ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 579–80 (2016).
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SIFIs should be greatly increased.28 Capital reserves constitute a
fundamental buffer that allow banks to be more resilient during times
of stress, thereby increasing the stability of the financial system.29 The
higher the capital reserves, the greater the losses banks are able to
absorb. This is especially true for tier one capital, which includes only
capital elements of the highest quality.30 But identifying the optimal
capital requirement for each SIFI requires a level of information that
regulators simply cannot have. Hence, capital requirements imposed
by regulators are likely to be either too lax, in which case they fail to
ensure the stability of the financial system, or too strict, in which case
they impose unnecessary constraints on SIFIs’ activities.31 Our liability
rule is an attempt to bypass these informational problems by improving
the incentives of shareholders on the one hand and by enlisting
markets in the monitoring of SIFIs’ solvency on the other.
28. See generally ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES:
WHAT’S WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 79–166 (2013) (discussing
the social benefits of higher capital requirements).
29. Id. at 6 (“Capital regulation requires that a sufficient fraction of a bank’s
investments or assets be funded with unborrowed money. . . . Having a minimal ratio
of unborrowed funds relative to total assets is a way to limit the share of assets that is funded
by borrowing. Because unborrowed funds are obtained without any promise to make
specific payments at particular times, having more equity enhances the bank’s ability to
absorb losses on its assets.”); see also Tarullo, supra note 20, at 65 (noting that capital
requirements “are . . . recognized as an especially supple prudential tool, insofar as they are
available to absorb losses from sources both anticipated and unanticipated by bankers and
regulators”). For an overview of capital bank regulation, see RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL.,
THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 215–69 (5th ed. 2013).
30. More precisely, tier one capital is divided in Common Equity tier one capital
(CET1) and Additional tier one capital. The former is composed of
qualifying common stock and related surplus net of treasury stock; retained
earnings; certain accumulated other comprehensive income (AOCI) elements
if the institution does not make an AOCI opt-out election . . . plus or minus
regulatory deductions or adjustments as appropriate; and qualifying common
equity tier 1 minority interests. . . . [Q]ualifying noncumulative perpetual
preferred stock, bank-issued Small Business Lending Fund and Troubled Asset
Relief Program instruments that previously qualified for tier 1 capital, and
qualifying tier 1 minority interests, less certain investments in other
unconsolidated financial institutions’ instruments that would otherwise
qualify as additional tier 1 capital.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Risk Management Manual of
Examination Policies, § 2.1-3 (2015) https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/manual
/section2-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JLE-WHPK].
31. See Harry DeAngelo & René M. Stulz, Liquid-Claim Production, Risk Management, and
Bank Capital Structure: Why High Leverage Is Optimal for Banks, 16 J. FIN. ECON. 219, 231–33
(2015) (discussing why exceedingly high capital requirements can impose substantial costs).
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Second, regulators have attempted to mitigate the moral hazard
problem created by bailouts. The financial crisis has reminded SIFIs once
more that they are just too big to fail, and hence regulators are forced to
intervene if a SIFI is in distress.32 In this vein, anticipating that governments
will bail them out in case of need, SIFIs have incentives to engage in
excessive risk-taking, while their creditors have weaker incentives to
monitor them.33 To prevent this moral hazard problem, regulators have
attempted to tie their own hands by introducing mechanisms to prevent
future bailouts. The most important of these mechanisms are the Orderly
Liquidation provisions in Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act,34 which aim to
facilitate the resolution of large, complex financial institutions by providing
for a new bankruptcy procedure to be used for bank holding companies
and their subsidiaries as an alternative to the Bankruptcy Code.35 A failing
institution is placed in receivership under the control of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).36 The FDIC, under the Orderly
Liquidation Authority (OLA), has the power to act swiftly in order to
find a new owner for the “good” parts of the failing institution, with
access to government money to finance the operations of a “bridge
bank” until the buyer for the good parts has been found.37 That should
ensure continuity of operations and therefore avoid the negative
effects on other financial institutions of a SIFI bankruptcy.
Yet, serious doubts have been raised as to whether the OLA would
be sufficient to resolve a major SIFI, such as Bank of America, which is
not only orders of magnitude larger than any of the commercial banks
the FDIC usually deals with, but also active across different businesses
and jurisdictions.38 Even more doubtful is whether the OLA would work
32. See GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE HAZARDS OF BANK
BAILOUTS 23–28 (2004) (discussing the too-big-to-fail problem).
33. See, e.g., Levitin, supra note 6, at 490 (“[I]f either or both creditors and
shareholders of such a TBTF [too-big-to-fail] institution believe they will be made
whole in a bailout—or not bear all the losses—they will have a reduced incentive to
monitor the TBTF institution’s risk-taking, and they will not demand as great of a risk
premium when they extend credit.”).
34. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2012)).
35. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381–394 (2012).
36. Id. § 5384(b).
37. Id. § 5390(h) (describing the functioning and the purpose of bridge financial
companies).
38. See Stephen J. Lubben, Resolution, Orderly and Otherwise: B of A in OLA, 81 U.
CIN. L. REV. 485, 513–16 (2012). The OLA procedure also raises thorny constitutional
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in the event of a systemic crisis in which the survival of not one, but
many, if not all, of the existing SIFIs was at stake.39 In such a case, it will
be virtually impossible to find a buyer for the good parts of the failing
SIFIs. Moreover, SIFIs’ operating companies may also face illiquidity, if
not insolvency problems, due to their credit or balance sheet
interconnections, which may make a government recapitalization the
only viable solution.40
Ultimately, committing not to bail out SIFIs is impossible. The
Darwinian proclivity for survival that characterizes political behavior in
democracies leads politicians and policymakers to offer bailouts no
matter how tough the ex ante rules on using taxpayers’ money to prop
up banks. The immediate political benefits of a bailout, namely, the
avoidance of the doomsday scenario of a financial and economic
meltdown, are bound to appear superior to navigating the political
consequences of such an outcome.41 As noted by the Financial Crisis
Inquiry Commission, “if you bail out AIG and you’re wrong, you will
have wasted taxpayer money and provoked public outrage. If you don’t
bail out AIG and you’re wrong, the whole financial system collapses.”42
In sum, “[b]ailouts are an inevitable feature of modern economies, in
which the interconnectedness of firms means that the entire economy
bears the risk of an individual firm’s failure.”43 Therefore, realistically,
policymakers should attempt to minimize the moral hazard created by
bailouts instead of hoping to convince the markets that bailouts will
not happen in the future. This is exactly what our extended liability
rule attempts to do.

problems. See Thomas W. Merrill & Margaret L. Merrill, Dodd-Frank Orderly Liquidation
Authority: Too Big for the Constitution?, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 165 (2014) (evaluating the
constitutional challenges and issues that Dodd-Frank triggers).
39. Lubben & Wilmarth, supra note 3, at 1205 (arguing that the resolution
procedures introduced with the Dodd-Frank Act are “unlikely to work as intended
during a future global crisis that involves multiple failing SIFIs operating thousands of
subsidiaries across dozens of national boundaries”).
40. See Stephen J. Lubben, OLA After Single Point of Entry: Has Anything Changed?,
(Seton Hall Pub. Law Res. Paper No. 2353035, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2353035.
41. See, e.g., Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, A New Capital Regulation for Large Financial
Institutions, 13 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 453, 482 (2011); Tarullo, supra note 20, at 69. On
the special insolvency mechanism, Tarullo notes that “the risks of an untested
resolution regime are real, and officials may not be willing to take even a modest
chance that a systemically important firm placed into resolution would implode.” Id.
42. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 1, at 433.
43. Levitin, supra note 6, at 439; see also Conti-Brown, supra note 9, at 424.
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The fact that firms are tightly interconnected has another fundamental
implication that economists have fully appreciated, although legal
scholars have sometimes overlooked: the structure of the financial sector,
and in particular the pattern of connections among financial institutions,
has a fundamental impact on the stability of the financial system.44 In
order to study these inter-bank connections and the network they form,
scholars of different fields have relied on network theory.45 Within the
framework of network theory, the building blocks of a network are its
nodes and the connections among them. Thus, if one models the financial
sector as a network, the banks and the other financial intermediaries
represent the nodes, while the financial flows among them represent
the connections.46 One important finding of this strand of literature is
that, besides size, the position and the level of a financial institution’s
interconnections also determine its ability to impose negative
externalities on the financial sector and the economy in general.47 In
fact, policymakers and economists alike have acknowledged that some

44. See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu et al., Systemic Risk and Stability in Financial Networks,
105 AM. ECON. REV. 564, 564 (2015) (“Since the global financial crisis of 2008, the view
that the architecture of the financial system plays a central role in shaping systemic
risk has become conventional wisdom.”).
45. Despite the enormous influence of network theory on many fields, legal
scholars have generally overlooked its insights, with some exceptions. See Alan
Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Third-Party Beneficiaries and Contractual Networks, 7 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 325, 325 (2015); Luca Enriques & Alessandro Romano, Institutional Investor
Voting Behavior: A Network Theory Perspective, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 223 (2019); Alessandro
Romano, Horizontal Shareholding: The End of Markets and the Rise of Networks (2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3255948. For an introduction
to network theory, see SANJEEV GOYAL, CONNECTIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
ECONOMICS OF NETWORKS (2009); MARK NEWMAN, NETWORKS (2d ed. 2018).
46. See, e.g., Marco Galbiati, Danilo Delpini & Stefano Battiston, The Power to
Control, 9 NATURE PHYSICS 126, 126 (2013).
47. Robin L. Lumsdaine et al., The Intrafirm Complexity of Systemically Important
Financial Institutions 1 (2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2604166 (“While size-based thresholds are appealing from a regulatory
perspective . . . , they are overly simplistic in the presumption that risk can be evaluated
via a single value.”); Serafin Martinez-Jaramillo et al., An Empirical Study of the Mexican
Banking System’s Network and Its Implications for Systemic Risk, 40 J. ECON. DYNAMICS &
CONTROL 242, 256 (2014) (centrality measures “go beyond size and, in some cases, are
not correlated or even negatively correlated with the size of an institution”). See Steven
L. Schwarcz, Derivatives and Collateral: Balancing Remedies and Systemic Risk, 2015 U. ILL.
L. REV. 699, 706–11, 713–15 (2015) (discussing interconnectedness and substitutability
of an institution as determinants of the systemic risk it poses).
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institutions are too interconnected to fail.48 For instance, the Federal
Reserve rescued Bear Stearns, a relatively small financial institution due
to its interconnections with other key financial actors.49
Network scholars have devised various measures to gauge the relevance
of an individual financial institution for the financial network as a whole,
that is, its “centrality.” One of the most commonly used measures of
centrality is known as the DebtRank, which measures the dollar value of
the harm imposed on the financial system by the distress of a given
financial institution.50 Notably, the DebtRank can be normalized between
zero and one, so that it captures the fraction of the financial network (in
value) that would be affected by the disruption of a node. In a
companion paper, two of us have argued that insights from network
theory can and should be used to improve on the effectiveness of financial
regulation.51 Similarly, we suggest below that measures of centrality
should be a key component in the development of an extended liability
regime for SIFI shareholders. Centrality allows policymakers to tailor
shareholder liability based on the harm that an individual SIFI would
impose on the financial system if it were to collapse.

48. See, e.g., Sheri Markose, Simone Giansante & Ali Rais Shaghaghi, ‘Too
Interconnected to Fail’ Financial Network of US CDS Market: Topological Fragility and Systemic
Risk, 83 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 627, 627 (2012); Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Statement Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission 20 (Sept. 2, 2010), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
testimony/bernanke20100902a.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZNF8-DHJT] (arguing that the
status of too-big-to-fail depends also on the complexity, the interconnectedness, and
the critical functions that a financial institution performs). See generally Michael
Gofman, Efficiency and Stability of a Financial Architecture with Too-Interconnected-To-Fail
Institutions, 124 J. FIN. ECON. 113 (2017).
49. See Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: Examining the Recent Actions of Federal Financial
Regulators, 110th Cong. 11 (2008) (statement of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.). Chairman Ben Bernanke stated,
Our financial system is extremely complex and interconnected, and Bear
Stearns participated extensively in a range of critical markets. . . . Given the
exceptional pressures on the global economy and the financial system, the
damage caused by a default by Bear Stearns could have been severe and
extremely difficult to contain.
Id.
50. See e.g., Stefano Battiston et al., DebtRank: Too Central to Fail? Financial Networks,
the FED and Systemic Risk, 2 SCI. REP., no. 541, 2012, at 1, 1.
51. Luca Enriques, Alessandro Romano & Thom Wetzer, Network-Sensitive Financial
Regulation, J. CORP. L. (forthcoming).
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Other Proposals to Extend Shareholders’ Liability

Scholars have long acknowledged that firms are able to impose negative
externalities on society due to the limited liability of their shareholders52
To address this concern, proposals to extend the liability of shareholders
have cyclically resurfaced. This Section provides a short overview of some
of the most influential of these proposals.
In the modern debate about the merits of limited liability, the first
scholars to question it as a general rule for corporations were Henry
Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman in an article that spurred great
controversy.53 They noted that shareholders are shielded from liability for
two kinds of corporate debts: those having a source in contracts and those
deriving from torts and argued that limited liability is appropriate for the
former but not the latter.54 In fact, they suggest that contract creditors
decide to enter in a relationship with the firm and can therefore assess its
creditworthiness and reliability.55 Moreover, they can contract on the
appropriate compensation for bearing the risk of default and can include
clauses to protect themselves from opportunistic behavior on the part of
the firm.56 Therefore, contractual creditors would not need the additional
protection deriving from unlimited shareholders’ liability. Instead, tort
creditors have not consented to enter into a relationship with the firm and
cannot contract ex ante about risk allocation. As a consequence,
shareholders can impose consequences on creditors that are not
internalized via private contracting. Building on these premises, Hansmann
and Kraakman concluded that, as a matter of general corporate law,
shareholders should face unlimited liability for tort losses.57
Their proposal had the great merit of challenging the standard
assumption that limited liability is an inherent feature of corporations
and aimed to restore the full force of tort law to tackle externalities. It
was not meant to tackle the specific problems arising from too-big-tofail financial institutions. But it is worth noting here that the kind of
externalities that tort law addresses are different from the ones
deriving from the failure of a large financial institution. As we explain

52. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 18, at 1879 (noting that limited liability “is
generally acknowledged to create incentives for excessive risk-taking by permitting
corporations to avoid the full costs of their activities”).
53. Id. at 1916, 1919–20.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1918–19.
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in Section II.B, most of SIFIs’ externalities qualify as pure economic
losses, giving no rise to a tort claim. Hence, Hansmann and
Kraakman’s proposal for unlimited shareholder liability in torts would
have little, if any, effect on shareholders’ incentives ex ante.
Fast forward twenty years, and the financial crisis prompted scholars to
advance new proposals to extend shareholder liability in order to curb
SIFIs’ propensity to engage in risky activities. Peter Conti-Brown has
advocated for the introduction of an “elective” unlimited liability for the
shareholders of systemically important institutions.58 The gist of his idea is
that shareholders would be allowed to collectively choose whether they
want to face unlimited liability for the total cost of their SIFI’s bailout or
hold higher capital reserves (15 to 20 percent).59 The problems with this
proposal are two-fold. First, under such a regime, shareholders cannot
figure out in advance the value of the expected liability because the “total
cost of bailout” cannot be known ex ante. Hence, they are unable to set
their level of precautions accordingly. Second, Conti-Brown confronts
shareholders with a draconian choice: high capital requirements arbitrarily
set by a regulator with limited information, or a regime of unlimited liability
based on the unpredictable and idiosyncratic determinations of
policymakers in times of economic tensions.60
Steven Schwarcz’s proposal on extended liability focuses instead on
“shadow banks” only, arguing that their “investor-managers” should face
a liability that is a multiple of their investment in the firm.61 His proposal,
however, does not engage with the questions of how to calculate the
“original investment” in the firm or what the multiple should be. Second,
his proposal is limited to shadow banking, which Schwarcz defines loosely
as including “special purpose entities (SPEs), . . . as well as finance
companies, hedge funds, money market mutual funds, nonbank
government sponsored enterprises, securities lenders, and investment
banks.”62 While shadow banks may be big taken together, they represent
a relatively marginal subset of SIFIs. In fact, since SIFI designation rules
entered into force, only one such entity has been designated as a SIFI, GE
58. Conti-Brown, supra note 9, at 429–31.
59. Id.
60. Conti-Brown himself admits “bailouts are political decisions—and politics do
not always play according to economic logic.” Id. at 429. Consequently, under his rule
also the amount of liability faced by shareholders might be determined without
following “an economic logic.” Id.
61. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Governance Structure of Shadow Banking: Rethinking
Assumptions About Limited Liability, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 28 (2014).
62. Id. at 2.
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Capital Holdings, but its designation was rescinded three years later.63
Finally, the proposal only extends the liability of “investor managers,” who
are defined as equity investors who also have “significant power to
control the firm’s actions.”64 However, this limitation raises the issue of
defining who has significant power to control the firm’s actions, which
might not always be straightforward. With a few notable exceptions,
such as hedge fund management firms and at many institutional
investors, nobody within the organization will have significant power
to control the SIFI’s actions.
Most recently, similar to Schwarcz but with reference to all SIFIs,
Charles Goodhart and Rosa Lastra have proposed an extended liability
regime for all “insiders who have both the information and capacity to
influence corporate decision-making.”65 In that category, they include,
in addition to top managers, large shareholders, i.e., those with a stake
higher than five percent.66 Shareholders with a stake between two and five
percent should be able to choose whether to be treated as “outsiders” or
“insiders,” and in the former case, shareholders must commit to not
exercise their voting rights. Large shareholders should “have double
liability, i.e. for an additional twice par value of their shares,”67 while insider
shareholders (those with between two and five percent of voting rights)
would “be liable to pay in an additional par value of their shares.”68
Leaving aside the inadequacy of par value as a multiplier for extended
liability in today’s environment,69 the distinction between large and small
shareholders under this proposal would seem to be a troublesome solution
to a relatively minor problem. The solution would be troublesome because
it would create a disincentive to invest more than the relevant thresholds,
which may be either self-defeating (if no one crosses the threshold) or such
that a disproportionate voting power is granted to larger shareholders (if
many of the insider shareholders opt for passivity). The problem it solves
63. See Financial Stability Oversight Council, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Mar. 9, 2019),
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Pages/default.aspx
[https://perma.cc/VMW3-8H94].
64. Schwarcz, supra note 61, at 29.
65. Charles A.E. Goodhart & Rosa M. Lastra, Equity Finance: Matching Liability to
Power 23–27, 29 (CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13494, 2019), http://eprints.lse.ac.uk
/100058/1/Goodhart_CEPR_DP13494.pdf [https://perma.cc/63AA-SMZZ].
66. See id. at 23.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 24.
69. See infra Section III.A.1. Goodhart and Lastra write with the U.K. in mind, a country
where par value is typically not as low as in the U.S., i.e. between one pence and a higher
fraction of one pound. See Eilís Ferran, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE LAW 18 (2008).
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is to avoid “the unfairness, and political unpopularity, of bankrupting
innocent, uninformed and powerless outside shareholders.”70 This
outcome would be highly unlikely in today’s equity markets, where most
individuals do not invest directly in equity shares. And those who do would
be unlikely to face financial ruin so long as liability is extended but not
unlimited. In addition, very small shareholders would be unlikely to be
sued at all for liability because it would not be cost-effective anyway.
The closest antecedent to our liability rule proposal is in legislation:
for roughly three quarters of a century, shareholders of American
banks were subject to double liability.71 More precisely, they were liable
for an amount in excess of their investment up to the par value of their
stock.72 Empirical studies confirmed that double liability was effective
in reducing banks’ risk-taking.73 Reviving this rule “as it was” would be
problematic. On the one hand, par value has become a meaningless
measure of the value of a stock.74 On the other hand, because of its
one-size-fits all approach, the expected liability faced by the shareholders
under a hypothetical double liability rule for SIFIs would not vary with the
size of the negative externalities that their SIFI can create and would thus
imperfectly mold shareholder incentives.
II. WHY EXTENDED LIABILITY?
In this Part, we discuss why both traditional limited liability and
various versions of an unlimited liability regime for SIFI shareholders
are not, or would not be, optimal.
A. Why Limited Liability Is Inappropriate for SIFIs
Limited liability has been the standard for U.S. corporations for over
150 years.75 If only for that reason, a strong justification is needed for
any deviation. This Section provides support for the proposition that
limited liability should not apply to SIFIs. Let us recall that a SIFI default
can have dramatic consequences on the financial system and ultimately
on the entire economy. The SIFIs’ shareholders will internalize only a
70. Goodhart & Lastra, supra note 65, at 27.
71. Macey & Miller, supra note 16, at 31.
72. Id.
73. Benjamin C. Esty, The Impact of Contingent Liability on Commercial Bank Risk
Taking, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 189, 189 (1998); Richard S. Grossman, Double Liability and Bank
Risk Taking, J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 143, 143 (2001).
74. See infra Section III.A.1.
75. See Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573,
604 (1986).

2020]

EXTENDED SHAREHOLDER LIABILITY

985

small fraction of such losses. Moreover, in order to prevent such a
fallout, and no matter what the statutes say about never again using
taxpayers’ money to save financial institutions, the government will be
forced to bail out the SIFI.76 As the SIFI shareholders and creditors are
aware of that, the former will favor excessively risky strategies while the
latter will fail to guard against them.77 This moral hazard problem is
further worsened because shareholders are unlikely to be completely
wiped out during a bailout. Hence, shareholders are likely to bear an
even smaller fraction of the losses caused by the distress of their SIFI.
There are a number of reasons to believe that the expected value of
a bailout for the shareholders is larger than zero. First, as a matter of
historical fact, the average shareholder has received a positive payoff
from bailouts. Even the bailout of AIG, which was litigated for being
exceedingly harsh on shareholders,78 actually prevented holders of
AIG common stock from being wiped out.79 Intuitively, politicians will
prefer to intervene too early rather than too late. After all, they act to
avoid the catastrophic effects of a systemic meltdown that may easily
cause a serious recession and cost them re-election; thus, they are
unlikely to wait until the very last moment when such are the stakes.
Hence, they will tend to inject money into SIFIs when shareholders still
own valuable shares thereby leaving them in place.
There is an even more fundamental reason to believe that the
expected value of government aid for SIFI shareholders cannot be
zero, namely, that alternatives to a bailout have a positive expected
value for shareholders. Consider, for instance, the case of “regulation
by deal,” in which a healthy firm is assisted by the government in the
acquisition of a defaulting SIFI. Examples of this practice during the last
financial crisis are ubiquitous and involved defaulting financial
institutions, such as Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch on one side and JP
76. See supra notes 3–9 and accompanying text.
77. Note that while the problem is more severe for SIFIs due to their unique ability to
impose large negative externalities and to the prospects of bailouts, limited liability can
induce in excessive risk-taking in every firm. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L.
Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 658–59 (2010).
78. See Aaron M. Kessler, U.S. Appeals Bailout Ruling That A.I.G. Bailout Terms Were
Too Harsh, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/13/
business/dealbook/us-appeals-ruling-that-aig-bailout-terms-were-too-harsh.html.
79. Mary G. Patterson, Starr International Co. v. United States: The AIG Bailout
Ruling, 35 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 19, 24 (2015) (“Despite its harsh terms, however, the
Credit Agreement successfully prevented AIG from going bankrupt, and in turn,
avoided the otherwise inevitable complete loss of investment return for all AIG
common stockholders.”).
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Morgan and Bank of America as their saviors, on the other.80 An
intervention of this kind clearly has a positive value for the shareholders
of the acquired firm because they can sell their shares to the aided
acquirer instead of being wiped out completely. Most importantly, as the
shareholders know that by opposing the merger they can impose a large
externality on the economy, they are likely to extract a high price for
shares that might otherwise be almost worthless.81 In short, it is
extremely unlikely that the expected value of government aid for SIFI
shareholders can be set to zero.
Having established that the benefit of a bailout to shareholders tends
to be higher than zero, it becomes even clearer why limited liability
cannot be an adequate rule for SIFIs. A fundamental principle of
modern corporations is that investors risk what they have invested in
the company: when the expected value of government aid is positive,
this principle is violated. Most importantly, it is violated exactly by
those firms, like SIFIs, that have the potential to impose the greatest
negative externalities on the economy. As noted above, this can result
in moral hazard problems and induce shareholders (and creditors) to
favor excessively risky strategies.82 Extended liability aims to restore this
axiom and prevent this moral hazard problem.
B. Why Not Unlimited Liability?
This Section explores why shareholders should not face unlimited
liability. The first step is defining exactly which losses shareholders would
internalize if unlimited liability was the rule. While at first glance trivial,
this task becomes very problematic in this context. To clarify this point,
we divide the losses caused by the distress of a SIFI into three categories:
losses to creditors, the cost of the bailout, and other externalities.83
To begin with, SIFI shareholders could be liable for the losses
experienced by contract creditors in addition to tort creditors.
However, unlimited liability towards contract creditors is opposed even
by the staunchest supporters of the idea of extending the liability faced

80. Yair Listokin & Inho Andrew Mun, Rethinking Corporate Law During a Financial
Crisis, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 349, 366–77 (describing, in greater detail, instances of
regulation by deal).
81. Id. at 369–74 (describing the hold-up problem created by regulation by deal
and providing the Bear Stearns merger as an example).
82. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
83. These categories of losses are, of course, interconnected. For instance, a large
bailout is likely to reduce creditors’ losses and the other externalities.
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by shareholders.84 Unsurprisingly, to the best of our knowledge, nobody
has ever explicitly advocated for an extension of liability towards contract
creditors. The basic reasons are that creditors that want higher guarantees
can simply contract around limited liability and that the interest rate will
incorporate the level of liability chosen by the parties.85 Nevertheless, it is
important to explore this rule in order to have a complete picture of
the alternatives available to the regulators.
In particular, unlimited liability towards creditors is simply inadequate
to address the problems created by SIFIs. SIFIs are not bailed out
because they impose losses on their creditors, but because they have the
potential to impose enormous losses onto agents that have not
contracted with the corporation.86 Unlimited liability towards contract
creditors would not solve this problem because neither creditors nor
shareholders would have incentives to account for such externalities.
At best, unlimited liability towards contract creditors would merely
constitute a transfer of resources from shareholders to creditors.
Under limited liability, an insolvent SIFI imposes significant losses on
its creditors, whereas under an unlimited liability regime, the fact that
creditors can rely on shareholders’ assets would mitigate these losses.
Therefore, making shareholders liable towards creditors might reduce
the risk propensity of shareholders but would also reduce the incentives
of creditors to monitor the SIFI.87 Thus, this form of unlimited liability
presents a trade-off in terms of monitoring incentives of shareholders and
creditors.88 It is unclear whether shareholders are in a better position than
creditors to monitor the SIFI. Hence, it cannot be predicted whether
unlimited liability towards creditors would make SIFIs safer.
At worst, unlimited liability towards creditors would simply achieve
nothing. Because lending money to SIFIs would become safer, debtors
would ask for lower interest rates. In turn, this would increase the
returns to shareholders in good states of the world, which might offset
their higher expected losses in bad states of the world (i.e., when the
84. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 18, at 1919–20.
85. Id.
86. See Richard W. Painter, Bailouts: An Essay on Conflicts of Interests and Ethics When
Government Pays the Tab, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 131, 158 (2009) (noting that the public
will ultimately bear the profit or loss of a corporation’s risk-taking).
87. Haelim Anderson, Daniel Barth & Dong Beom Choi, Reducing Moral Hazard at
the Expense of Market Discipline: The Effectiveness of Double Liability Before and During the
Great Depression 2, 5 (Office of Financial Research Research Paper 18-06, 2018)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3265163.
88. Id.
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SIFI goes bust). The ability of shareholders and creditors to contract
around interest rates to account for the level of risk might neutralize
any substantial effect of extending liability towards creditors.
Against this background, increasing shareholder liability can only be
effective if it forces agents with the ability to affect the behavior of the
SIFI to account for externalities imposed on society at large.89 One
possible approach, suggested by Conti-Brown, is to make shareholders
liable for the cost of actual bailouts as an alternative—freely chosen by
the individual SIFI—to higher capital ratios.90 However, having
shareholders bear the cost of bailouts creates significant problems. To
begin with, it would further politicize the debate around bailouts in a
period of political and economic tension. Some politicians might seize
the opportunity of earning consent by advocating for very large
bailouts funded with shareholder money. The narrative of using the
money of large institutional investors to cover the losses caused by the
stock market is likely to gain significant traction among a certain part of
the electorate. Other politicians, instead, would be exposed to the
political pressure of a relatively small and cohesive group of institutional
shareholders with a homogeneous interest in minimizing their expected
liability and hence the size of the bailout. These conflicting political
interests would generate policy outcomes that would weaken financial
stability and overall social welfare at a particularly vulnerable moment.
Furthermore, for a liability rule to provide the right incentives, those
facing potential liability must be able to affect the probability and the
dimension of such liability by engaging in monitoring and other riskreducing activities. However, in this case, the liability faced by the
shareholders would largely depend on unpredictable political
decisions outside their control. As a consequence, they would not be
able to adopt the optimal precautions to minimize their liability risk.
Concerns about shareholders’ limited capacity to estimate or to
control the extent of their future liability prompt objections to the
imposition of unlimited liability regimes.91 However, this standard
objection is based on the inability of shareholders sufficiently to
control the excessive risk-taking proclivities of their own agents, the
89. Schwarcz, supra note 19, at 206 (arguing that “the externalities of systemic
failure include social costs that can extend far beyond market participants. Thus,
market participants will not want to internalize those costs and will take an insufficient
amount of care to prevent them”).
90. Conti-Brown, supra note 9, at 412–13.
91. See Schwarcz, supra note 61, at 10 (referencing a liability regime where
shareholders are only liable if they have “capacity to control” their firms).
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managers of the corporation.92 In this context, shareholders’ inability
to control the excessive risk-taking that could result in liability is even
more profound because decisions about whether and how to bailout a
SIFI depends not on the managers of the SIFI, over whom shareholders
have some control, but on the government, which is an agent over which
shareholders’ ability to exercise control is, and should be, attenuated.
Therefore, making shareholders liable for the portion of harm that
depends on the reaction of the government would not improve financial
stability. Rather, it would discourage investment in the financial sector.
The third option, namely making SIFIs’ shareholders unlimitedly
liable for torts, would also be unviable. Current tort rules on causation
and pure economic losses would make an unlimited liability rule largely
ineffective in inducing SIFIs’ shareholders to internalize the losses caused
by the distress of their firm. It would also be insufficient to couple
shareholder liability with a change in tort law that stretches causation to
allow for recovery of pure economic loss. Allowing the recovery of pure
economic loss from shareholders would open the door to complex and
endless litigation and ultimately result in uncertainty.
A significant part of the harm caused by the distress of a SIFI
qualifies as what in tort parlance are called “pure economic losses,”93
which are generally not recognized by the tort system. That is,
compensation will generally be denied to plaintiffs that are unable to
establish a direct connection between their physical injury or property
damage and the acts or omissions of defendants.94 Most of the losses
92. This argument was frequently embraced by judges who were preoccupied with
the unfairness of assigning a large liability to shareholders who are not in the “capacity
to control” or influence the decisions of management. See id. at 9. For an early
formulation of this view, see Spear v. Grant, 16 Mass. 9, 14 (1819) (“[I]f [a stockholder]
were equally liable to each holder of the notes (which he must be if liable at all; for if
the facts agreed create a promise to one, they create a promise to all), then the most
palpable injustice would take place. For a stockholder, wholly innocent and ignorant
of the mismanagement, which has brought the bank into discredit, might be ruined
by reason of owning a single share in the stock of the corporation.”).
93. John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value, 6 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 35, 46 (2014). See, e.g., People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail.
Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 109 (N.J. 1985) (“[A] virtually per se rule barring recovery for
economic loss unless the negligent conduct also caused physical harm has evolved
throughout this century, based, in part, on Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint and
Cattle v. Stockton Waterworks Co.” (internal citations omitted)). One recognized
exception is that of fishermen, as they can recover pure economic losses associated
with a lost opportunity to fish. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 610 (1999).
94. Anita Bernstein, Keep It Simple: An Explanation of the Rule of No Recovery for Pure
Economic Loss, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 773, 773 (2006).
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that are caused by the distress of a SIFI are likely to be too remote to
meet the traditional tests for causation required by the law of torts.
Consider, for instance, the following case. A distressed SIFI cannot
meet its obligation to pay one of its creditors, say, a carmaker. Hence,
the carmaker cuts its orders from its supplier, which in turn goes
bankrupt. Assume also that the carmaker could have kept a steady level
of production after hearing of the SIFI’s distress by borrowing money
at higher interest rates. Would the distress of the SIFI be the proximate
cause of the default of the carmaker’s supplier? It is true that the
supplier of the carmaker would have not gone bankrupt but for the
distress of the SIFI, yet there was another event (i.e., the decision of
the carmaker not to borrow more money) that likely broke the chain
of causation. Given that the spillovers from a SIFI’s distress will
propagate through the economy, countless instances akin to the one
just described are likely to emerge that would fall outside the reach of
tort law. Denying compensation for pure economic losses and for losses
that are “remote” would again defeat the purpose of extending
shareholders’ liability, which is inducing shareholders to account for the
externalities that a default of their institution would cause on society at
large. However, allowing plaintiffs to recover losses that are not
proximately caused by the injurer and pure economic losses means that
judges would have to develop a whole new set of rules just for dealing with
SIFIs’ bankruptcies. It is easy to foresee that this process would involve costly
and complex litigation and generate great uncertainty. Thus, unlimited
liability seems unworkable with the existing tort rules on harm causation.
The last option would be making SIFI shareholders liable for all the
liabilities of their institution, regardless of whether such liabilities are
contractual in nature. In this vein, shareholders would have to cover
the losses of the creditors, the cost of the bailout, and any additional
loss caused by the default of the SIFI for which the SIFI itself is liable
according to general tort law or other doctrines and rules. In other
words, this solution would be a “pure” unlimited liability.
And yet, this solution is not workable either: it compounds the flaws of
all the forms of unlimited liability analyzed so far while also creating four
additional problems. First, due to the draconian risk associated with this
form of shareholders’ liability, it will be difficult if not impossible for SIFIs
to find equity investors. A lack of investment in them would damage the
economy because SIFIs, like financial firms more generally, create positive
externalities by making the allocation of capital within the economy more
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efficient and moving economic resources to more productive uses.95 As
Schumpeter noted more than a century ago, “the services provided by
financial intermediaries—mobilizing savings, evaluating projects,
managing risk, monitoring managers, and facilitating transactions—are
essential for technological innovation and economic development.”96 A
large fraction of the benefit created by these activities is thus not
internalized by financial intermediaries, and it spills over to the most
productive sectors of the economy.97 While economists have at times
questioned the idea that financial development can facilitate economic
growth, “[a] growing body of work would push even most skeptics
toward the belief that the development of financial markets and
institutions is a critical and inextricable part of the growth process.”98
When an activity produces positive externalities, an unlimited
liability rule thus results in over-deterrence, excessively discouraging

95. Jeffrey Wurgler, Financial Markets and the Allocation of Capital, 58 J. FIN. ECON.
187, 188 (2000) (“Financially developed countries increase investment more in their
growing industries and decrease investment more in their declining industries. Thus,
although financially developed countries might not invest at a higher level they do
seem to allocate their investment better.” (citations omitted)).
96. Robert G. King & Ross Levine, Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right,
108 Q.J. ECON. 717, 717 (1993) (describing Schumpeter’s view as expressed in JOSEPH
A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1911) and providing
empirical evidence in its support).
97. The idea that firms produce positive externalities due to their activity and that
therefore it is important to enhance their ability to attract capital is a traditional
argument in favor of limited liability. The key role that the financial sector plays in the
economy further strengthens this argument for SIFIs. For a general formulation of the
argument see, for example, BAINBRIDGE & HENDERSON, supra note 12, at 50–51
(“[T]here is considerable truth to the widely shared view that limited liability was, and
remains, essential to attracting the enormous amount of investment capital necessary for
industrial corporations to arise and flourish. . . . By allowing the public corporation to
develop, limited liability thus was in large measure responsible for the development of our
modern economic system.”). For similar arguments, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE
AND AMERICAN LAW: 1836–1937, 54 (1991) (“Limited liability clearly encouraged the flow of
capital into new enterprise.”); Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and
Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259, 262 (1967) (“Limited liability is probably an essential aspect
of a large corporate system with widespread public participation.”); Jonathan R. Macey, The
Limited Liability Company: Lessons for Corporate Law, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 433, 451 (1995)
(“[G]ranting limited liability helps firms not only to raise capital, but also to encourage
investments in human and firm-specific capital.”).
98. Ross Levine, Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda, 35 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 688, 688–89 (1996).
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parties from engaging in it.99 Consider a simple example. Assume that
by contributing to the efficient allocation of capital within an economy,
a SIFI can make profits of $70 and produce a positive externality of
$40, provided that it does not go bankrupt. Moreover, assume that the
SIFI has a 50 percent chance of going bankrupt, and that by defaulting
it would cause a systemic harm equal to $100, for which the SIFI would
be liable according to general tort law rules. From a social perspective,
it is optimal if the SIFI engages in its activity because its expected value
is positive.100 However, under an unlimited liability rule that does not
account for positive externalities, the SIFI will find it unprofitable to
conduct its activity. Therefore, unlimited liability would lead financial
markets to shrink beyond what is optimal. In turn, this might have a
negative impact on many other sectors of the economy.
A second drawback of unlimited liability is that it would create the
perverse incentive of pressuring SIFIs to reduce their equity to the bare
minimum required by regulation and to limit the extent of potential
damage by concentrating ownership in the hands of a small number
of shareholders.101 At present, most SIFIs hold reserves in excess of the
minimum threshold imposed by the law.102 As unlimited liability
increases the cost of equity vis-à-vis the cost of debt, it is less likely that
SIFIs would continue to hold extra reserves if such a rule were passed.
The third problem with unlimited liability stems from the fact that
bailouts take place in times of economic tensions; SIFI defaults, if a
bailout is not engineered, create these tensions. During these times
policymakers (and, to a lesser degree, courts) are exposed to great
pressure from various interest groups and public opinion in general.
As a result, political decisions taken in the proximity of a financial crisis

99. Robert D. Cooter & Ariel Porat, Liability Externalities and Mandatory Choices:
Should Doctors Pay Less?, 1 J. TORT L. 1, 6 (2006) (noting that when an activity produces
a positive externality the damages should be set below 100 percent).
100. The expected value of this activity would be equal to (70 + 40) * 0.5 – 100 * 0.5 = 5.
Hence, the activity creates a positive value.
101. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 18, at 1886.
102. See, e.g., Maheen Khan, Capital and RWA for Tier 1 US Banks–2Q 2018, CLARUS
FIN. TECH. (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.clarusft.com/capital-and-rwa-for-tier-1-usbanks-2q-2018 [https://perma.cc/9V6G-G9MU] (showing that top U.S. banks all had
Common Equity Tier 1 capital ratios well above the statutory minimum at the end of
the second quarter of 2018, ranging from 11.1 percent for Goldman Sachs to 16.0
percent for Morgan Stanley, well above the 7 percent minimum).
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tend to be, “to put it mildly, less than optimal.”103 This is a significant
drawback of any possible form of the unlimited liability rule because
the quantification of the harm is bound to be made ex-post (i.e.,
during a time of economic and political tension), and hence to be
driven by political considerations. In this vein, the amount of liability
that shareholders will face is unpredictable ex ante and unlikely to be
an accurate measure of the harm. Consequently, the deterrence effects
of unlimited liability rules are highly imperfect.
Finally, perhaps the biggest drawback of a regime of unlimited liability
as compared with our preferred approach of extended, but bounded,
liability is that private liability insurance markets would be far more likely
to emerge to protect investors in bounded liability regimes than in
unlimited liability regimes. Just as liability insurance is available from
private carriers in a variety of contexts, such as for officers and directors
of public companies, we believe that insurance markets would generate
liability coverage for shareholders facing heightened (but not unlimited)
liability for the failure of the SIFIs they are invested in. As we further
argue in Section IV.A, we are dubious that an active or vibrant
insurance market for such a risk would exist if liability were unlimited
because of the difficulty of calculating the risks of loss.
III. THE PROPOSED EXTENDED LIABILITY RULE
This Part describes how we propose to shape an extended liability
rule that accounts for the features of present-day financial markets and
better serves the goal of neutralizing the moral hazard created by bailout
expectations. With that goal in mind, we devise a liability regime
specifically aimed to provide shareholders with greater incentives to
monitor management so as to avoid excessive risk-taking. Its main
function is deterrence rather than compensation. The regime we
envisage is one of SIFI shareholder liability for up to the average share
price in the period preceding the SIFI’s bailout or orderly liquidation,

103. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1527 (2005) (discussing the case of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act); see A.C. Pritchard, The SEC at 70: Time for Retirement?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073,
1081–82 (2005) (“Scandal driven reform followed by political neglect has been a
recurring pattern in the securities markets. . . . That dynamic means that demands for
financial market regulation will arise in times of crisis. . . . Crisis, however, does not
create the ideal environment for developing balanced, cost-effective policy
interventions. Politicians will want to ‘do something,’ even if the proposed something
may prove to be costly, ineffective or counterproductive.”).
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with the precise amount depending on the SIFI’s systemic relevance as
proxied by its position within the financial network.
A. The Building Blocks of the Rule
To define the contours of our proposed extended liability rule for
SIFI shareholders, we identify and answer seven questions: (1) What
should be the upper bound to liability? (2) How can the extent of
liability be made sensitive to the specific systemic relevance of the
individual SIFI, so that shareholders have greater incentives to monitor
those SIFIs that endanger the financial system more? (3) What would
trigger extended SIFI shareholders’ liability? (4) Which shareholders
should be liable? (5) What should be the standard for liability? (6) How
would the new rule coordinate with the existing capital requirements
regime? and (7) Who should recover and where would the money go?
1.

The liability cap
The basic element of our proposal for an extended liability regime
is the liability cap, or the maximum amount of liability SIFI shareholders
should be required to bear. Under the traditional double liability rule, a
bank’s shareholders were liable in excess to their investment in the bank
up to the par value of their stocks.104 In today’s markets, the par value is
no longer a reliable proxy of the value of a firm. It suffices to notice
that, as of August 6, 2019, the price of Apple shares was $193.34,
whereas their par value was just $0.00001.105 Hence, the stock price is
over 19 million times higher than the par value. Similarly, the stock
price of Goldman Sachs share on the same day was $201.68, whereas
the par value was just $0.01.106 For that reason, we need to introduce a
different base to calculate the liability cap.
While no cap can be devised that will provide for the optimal level
of shareholder monitoring over excessive risk-taking, we posit that a
reasonable starting point is the average market price of a common
stock during the time that goes from thirteen months before
shareholder liability is triggered (t_13) to one month before that
(t_1).107 We call the time between t_13 and t_1 the “value window.” The
advantage of having a value window is threefold. First, the expected
liability will not be drastically reduced by the unavoidable drop in the
104.
105.
106.
107.

Macey & Miller, supra note 16, at 31.
Apple Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Sept. 29, 2018).
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Dec. 31, 2018).
For the timing of the shareholder liability trigger, see infra Section III.A.3.
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stock price that precedes a SIFI’s collapse. Second, a value window
accounts for the fact that the monitoring of SIFIs is an ongoing
process, and that a default of an institution of this magnitude is
generally the result of a series of decisions taken during a considerable
time interval. Recall, for instance, the movie “The Big Short.”108 In
describing the events that led to the financial crisis, it shows how SIFIs’
insiders engaged in reckless behavior for years before the financial
system collapsed. In fact, over two years passed between the time when
Michael Burry, the hedge fund manager, first discovered the problems
with the housing markets and the explosion of the financial crisis. In
this vein, tying the liability to a specific point in time would be
unreasonable. Third, with an average of 365 data points, abnormal
stock price fluctuations will not dramatically affect the expected value
of the liability. For instance, assume that the price of Bank of America’s
stocks is equal to $100 for the 365 days of the value window. In this case,
the base to calculate the expected liability will be $100. Assume now that
over a single day, the price of Bank of America’s shares doubles. In this
case, the base to calculate the expected liability will be $100.27.109 This
stability increases predictability and protects shareholders from
sudden, extreme changes in stock prices.
2.

The multiplier
Double liability had the goal of preserving the stability of the single
bank. Hence, it was reasonable to have a one size-fits-all solution for all
banks. Our rule’s purpose is, rather, to preserve the stability of the
financial system, and thus, we introduce a multiplier that reflects the
risk that the individual SIFI imposes on the system. The advantage of
using a multiplier is that the extent of liability can be made a function
of the level of risk posed by the specific SIFI, thereby exposing the
shareholders of SIFIs that can cause more (less) systemic harm to
higher (lower) liability. As an outcome, shareholders of more central
firms will have greater incentives to prevent excessive risk-taking.
There is ample empirical evidence suggesting that the systemic risk
posed by an institution depends on its size and its position in the
financial network.110 Therefore, the multiplier must account for the
108. THE BIG SHORT (Paramount Pictures 2015).
109. If the price of the shares is equal to $100 for the entire year, then the base to
calculate the liability will be equal to (100 * 365)/365 = $100. Instead, if for one day
the stock price goes to $200, the base of the liability will be equal to ((100 * 364) +
(200 * 1))/365 = $100.27.
110. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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size of the SIFI and for its centrality, that is, for its systemic relevance.
Larger and more central institutions pose higher systemic risk, and
therefore, their shareholders should face higher liability. For these
reasons, it is useful to define the multiplier in terms of a network-based
(normalized) indicator of the firm’s systemic relevance, such as the
DebtRank Score (DRS).111 Imagine that the average stock price of the
shares over the relevant value window for a given SIFI is $100, and that
its DRS equals 0.6. Then the liability faced by the shareholder will be
equal to 100 * (1 + 0.6) = $160.112 Because 0 < DRS < 1, the maximal
liability that shareholders can face is twice the average price of the
shares during the value window.
To be sure, we do not claim that this multiplier leads to optimal
deterrence. In fact, a risk-averse regulator that wants to further increase
the incentives of SIFI shareholders to monitor might choose a multiplier
greater than 1. And yet, even if optimal deterrence is not achieved, it is key
to adopt a network measure of centrality like the DSR as a multiplier since
it allows policymakers to connect the liability faced by SIFI shareholders to
the centrality of their firm. This is important for two reasons.
First, the goal of the proposed liability rule is countering the
perverse incentives created by the prospect of bailouts. As the expected
value of the bailout is higher for firms that are more central, liability
must also be higher to neutralize the effects on the shareholders.
Second, the variation in the extent of liability for individual SIFIs
generated by the DebtRank is especially relevant in a world in which
large institutional investors own stakes in many SIFIs but have limited
resources to engage in monitoring. Consider the case in which there
are three systemically important financial institutions: JP Morgan
Chase, Goldman Sachs, and Bank of America. Assume that a default of
JP Morgan Chase would take down half of the financial system (i.e., its
DRS is 0.5), whereas Goldman Sachs and Bank of America would only
take down one tenth of the financial system (i.e., their DRS is 0.1). Last,
imagine that mutual funds managed by BlackRock are equally invested
in these three financial institutions. In a world in which a double
liability is in place, BlackRock would face equal liability for the default

111. See Battiston et al., supra note 50; Marco Bardoscia et al., DebtRank: A Microscopic
Foundation for Shock Propagation, 10(6) PLOS ONE, e0130406, 2015, at 2,
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0130406&type=
printable [https://perma.cc/BNJ3-E2HF] (noting that the original DebtRank helped shift
attention towards “interconnectedness as a crucial driver of systemic risk”).
112. The calculation to determine the liability is 100 * (1 + 0.6) = $160.
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of these three banks. Consequently, it will evenly divide the resources
that it can devote to monitoring among the three institutions.
However, this outcome is undesirable because JP Morgan Chase can
cause much larger disruption to the economy, and therefore, it would
be efficient if BlackRock concentrated a significant part of its resources
on monitoring JP Morgan. Our rule would lead to this result. In fact,
the tailored multiplier would cause BlackRock to face liability five
times higher per dollar invested if JP Morgan Chase goes bankrupt
than if either Goldman Sachs or Bank of America go bankrupt. For this
reason, as desired, BlackRock would deploy more resources to
monitoring JP Morgan Chase.
Defining the multiplier and the base to calculate the liability this way
has another fundamental advantage compared to Conti-Brown’s
proposal:113 it minimizes the role that interest groups and the political
process play because the criteria to quantify the compensation that
shareholders have to pay are defined ex ante (i.e., before the distress
of the SIFI) and are entirely transparent. For this reason, shareholders
are perfectly able to anticipate the liability they face and to set their
level of monitoring accordingly.
3.

The trigger
The most straightforward way to identify the exact moment of the
extended liability trigger is to refer to the start of the OLA process.114
The OLA process has its own procedural complexities.115 The first step
is a determination of systemic risk made by the Federal Reserve Board
and the FDIC.116 This determination has to be ratified by the Treasury
Secretary, in consultation with the President.117 Thus, liability could be
triggered when this procedural process is completed.
There is, however, one obvious problem with this approach. As
noted above, the OLA process might be inadequate to cope with the
problems created by the largest SIFIs or with periods of economic

113. See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text.
114. Needless to say, an additional trigger would be the entry into a different
bankruptcy proceeding, such as Chapter 11 or FDIC-led resolution, should the OLA
procedure not be triggered, and no bailout occur.
115. 12 U.S.C. § 5382 (2012).
116. Id. § 5383. An exception is if the firm is a broker-dealer or an insurance
company. Id. In this case, the determination of systemic risk from the FDIC is replaced
by a vote from either the SEC or the Director of the Federal Insurance Office. Id.
117. Id.
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tension that simultaneously endanger multiple large SIFIs.118 In this
case, a regulator might be forced to bypass the OLA and opt for a
bailout. Thus, using the OLA as trigger for the liability rule would have
the paradoxical result of protecting the shareholders of the largest
SIFIs from liability. A way to prevent this outcome is for liability to be
triggered by an OLA determination or government intervention in
favor of a SIFI in distress. Since the government has multiple ways to
assist a SIFI (for instance, by issuing guarantees to facilitate the merger
with a sound bank), it would be impossible to provide an exhaustive
list of the kinds of interventions that should trigger shareholders’
liability. For this reason, we argue that shareholders should be liable
whenever a government subsidy exceeds a de minimis threshold,119
independently from the form of the subsidy.
4.

Which liable shareholders?
One obvious complication is that shares are frequently traded, and
hence, shareholders will change over time. For this reason, it becomes
important to define precisely when the liability should kick in to
determine which individuals or institutions should be liable. Hansmann
and Kraakman note that two corner solutions are possible. The first,
which they call the “judgement” rule, attaches liability to the people that
own shares at the moment in which a judgment is made.120 In this
context, it would imply that the liability attaches only to the shareholders
that own the shares at the time of entry into the OLA proceeding or
the bailout. The obvious problem with this approach is that when there
are signals that the OLA process or the bailout is approaching, all
potentially solvent shareholders will have strong incentives to sell their
share at a very low cost to avoid liability. Another possible approach is
the so-called “occurrence” rule, under which liability attaches at the
moment in which the tort occurs.121 This approach means that whoever
held shares at the moment in which the SIFI made the decisions
leading to its bankruptcy should be held liable. This is an unworkable
solution, however, because, in this context, it is impossible to pinpoint
a single moment leading to the negative outcome.
118. See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text.
119. A possible way to determine this threshold is with respect to stock prices. For
instance, assume that according to the formula discussed in Section III.A.1, the share
price is $1 and the SIFI issued 100 shares. Then, liability could be triggered whenever
the subsidy has a value higher than $10, i.e., ten percent of the value of the SIFI.
120. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 18, at 1896.
121. Id.
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We suggest that all the individuals and institutions that held shares
during the twelve months leading to the OLA or bailout trigger
(hereinafter, liability window) will be liable in proportion to the value
of the shares they held, the time during which they held those shares,
and the multiplier of the SIFI.122 Note that this window is not the same
as the value window. In fact, while the value window goes from thirteen
months before the trigger to one month before the trigger, the liability
window goes from one year before the trigger to the trigger day. The
liability window also includes the month preceding the OLA trigger
because we intend to give shareholders incentives to monitor and to
avoid excessive risk-taking between t_1 and the OLA trigger.
This mechanism would work as follows: assume that a shareholder
owned ten shares for the entire liability window and that these shares
traded on average at $1 each during the value window. Assume also
that the DRS of this institution is equal to 0.5. Her liability would then
be equal to $15. Assume now that the same shareholder only held these
shares for half of the liability window. Her liability would now be equal
to $7.50. The advantage of this solution is twofold. On the one hand,
it is hard to evade because divesting right before the OLA process is
triggered has only a marginal impact on the liability faced by a
shareholder. On the other hand, such a rule accounts for the fact that
monitoring of SIFIs to ensure their stability is an ongoing process. In
addition, it is consistent with the circumstance that a default of an
institution of this magnitude is generally the result of a series of
decisions taken during a considerable time interval.
5.

The standard
Another fundamental aspect of the rule is which liability standard
should apply. One possibility is to hold shareholders liable only if they
have been negligent. The main problem with this approach, however, is
that it would be very hard for courts to determine whether shareholders
have been negligent in monitoring the manager. Moreover, it is
122. One possible issue would be hidden ownership, that is, the use of derivatives
to hold a long position in the SIFI. This practice will not pose a problem if the
derivative has as a counterparty a financial institution other than the SIFI. In fact, in
this case, the counterparty holding the shares for hedging purposes will be liable and
the derivatives contract will deal with the consequences. However, the SIFI itself should
not be allowed to act as a counterparty to derivatives granting a long position in itself,
as the SIFI would have to be held liable for its own default. For a discussion of hidden
ownership, see Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and
Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CALIF. L. REV. 811, 836–39 (2006).
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perfectly possible that some shareholders have been negligent, whereas
others have monitored carefully. Therefore, courts should make a
separate negligence finding with respect to each shareholder. Besides
being costly and time consuming, these negligence findings might
undermine the deterrent effect if they are—as it is reasonable to
expect—often inaccurate. On the contrary, a strict liability rule would
be faster and easy to administer. All shareholders would become liable
once the OLA procedure is triggered or the bailout executed,
independently of the level of monitoring in which they had engaged.
The law and economics literature offers support for the choice of a
strict liability over a negligence rule.123 In fact, as a rule of thumb, strict
liability can be desirable when the potential injurers (in our case, the
shareholders) have better information than the courts on the optimal
care level to be adopted.124 In this context, it is certainly the case that
shareholders, and especially sophisticated institutional investors, are
more informed than the courts on how to monitor managers.
6.

Extended liability and capital structure
One of the most devastating criticisms raised against the idea of
increasing shareholders’ liability regards firms’ ability to adjust their
capital structure.125 Firms are interested in minimizing their overall
cost of capital and will choose the combination of debt and equity that
allows them to reach this goal. 126 Unlimited liability of shareholders
would greatly increase the cost of equity while leaving unchanged the
cost of debt.127 As a consequence, firms would minimize their
outstanding equity and switch to an even more highly leveraged capital
structure.128 To understand this point, imagine a very simple scenario—
in line with the famous framework developed by Modigliani and

123. See A. Mitchell Polinsky, Strict Liability vs. Negligence in a Market Setting, 70 AM.
ECON. REV. 363, 363 (1980).
124. Robert D. Cooter, Economic Theories of Legal Liability, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 11, 23
(1991). Cooter notes that a negligence rule is preferable to strict liability when the
standard of care that injurers should adopt is knowable by the court. Since, in this case,
the court cannot determine the standard of care that shareholders should adopt, a
strict liability rule is preferable.
125. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital
Markets Perspective, 102 YALE L.J. 387, 405–06 (1992).
126. RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 221 (12th ed. 2017).
127. Grundfest, supra note 125, at 405.
128. BAINBRIDGE & HENDERSON, supra note 12, at 73.
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Miller129—in which the cost of debt and equity is identical, and hence,
the firm will be indifferent between financing itself through debt or
through equity. However, assume now that an unlimited liability rule
for shareholders is introduced. The cost of equity will greatly increase
to reflect the increased risk of liability because shareholders now face
losses in excess of their investment in the firm. On the contrary,
creditors’ potential losses are still limited to the amount lent to the firm.
Hence, the cost of debt will remain constant. The same firm would now
find it more convenient to increase its leverage and finance a larger part
of its operation through debt to reduce its expected liability. However,
as the value of equity shrinks, the expected liability per dollar invested
in the firm by the equity holders increases. This further tips the balance
in favor of debt financing, which will shrink the equity cushion even
more. Thus, the paradoxical outcome of a rule aimed at extending
shareholders’ liability could be a vicious circle in which firms adjust
their capital structure so that there will be very little equity to which
liability can be attached. And as the expected liability associated with
the remaining equity will be extremely large, the share value will be
much higher for judgment proof investors.
For SIFIs, however, the situation is drastically different because the
regulator has imposed minimum capital requirements. That is, the
regulator has set a minimum size of the equity cushion in the form of
capital ratios. Therefore, SIFIs cannot reduce equity beyond a certain
point.130 Yet, under a rule of unlimited shareholder liability, shareholders
would have even greater incentives not to go above the regulatory floor,
which, according to leading economists, is inadequate.131 In other words, by
increasing the liability exposure of equity capital, higher shareholder liability
would make financing through debt even more convenient for SIFIs.
On the contrary, our proposed extended liability regime would induce
SIFIs to reduce their leverage, without forcing onto them the straitjacket
of one-size-fits-all capital requirements devised by a regulator that is
bound to have imperfect information.
In fact, with a minor tweak, our proposed liability rule can reduce the
cost of equity vis-à-vis the cost of debt and hence incentivize SIFIs to
reduce their leverage. In particular, the shareholders should be allowed

129. See generally Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital,
Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958)
(discussing the cost of capital for a firm that can obtain capital from many sources).
130. See supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text.
131. See ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 28, at 179.
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to reduce their liability by increasing the SIFI’s equity cushion. That is,
shareholders should have to bear the full extended liability only if their
capital exactly matches the mandated capital ratios. Any increase in tierone capital held in excess to the capital requirement would generate a
proportional reduction of the extended liability. For instance, assume
that the capital requirement of a SIFI is 8 percent, and that the SIFI
holds exactly 8 percent in tier one capital. The SIFI shareholders would
then have to cover the extended liability in full. If the SIFI has an extra
4 percent of equity cushion, then the extended liability will be halved.
In this vein, the shareholders will return to a regime of single liability
if their SIFI has an equity cushion that is twice as large as the one
mandated (in this example, 16 percent).
It is easy to see why this feature of our rule allows shareholders to
reduce their liability by reducing leverage. Returning to the example,
assume that now the SIFI—with an equity cushion of 12 percent—needs
fresh money and must decide whether to issue bonds or raise new equity.
In the former case, the basis on which liability is calculated would increase.
On the opposite, if new equity is issued, the basis on which liability is
calculated would decrease and the expected liability would be discounted
by the amount of capital held in excess over the capital requirement.
With this tweak, our proposal would share with Conti-Brown’s the feature
of granting shareholders the right to decide on the extent of their own
liability.132 However, under his proposal, shareholders can only decide
between a very high capital requirement or unlimited liability. Instead, our
rule grants shareholders a much wider choice because it allows them to
choose the combination of liability and capital requirement that they prefer
within the parameters set by the regulator.
7.

Collecting from shareholders
The goal of our proposed rule is deterrence. Hence, who gets the
money is a second order problem. However, one obvious possibility is
that the money collected goes to, and is collected by, the FDIC, as a
reserve to be used to fund either payouts to depositors of failed banks
or bridge financing within OLA proceedings.133 Another possibility is
132. See supra text preceding note 59.
133. In an OLA resolution, the bridge bank used to temporarily transfer a bank’s
assets and liabilities to ensure continuity can be financed via a credit line drawn from
the Treasury. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe, Bank Resolution in the
European Banking Union: A Transatlantic Perspective on What It Would Take, 115 COLUM.
L. REV. 1297, 1311–12 (2015). The funds recovered from shareholders could be used
in future OLA resolutions as funding for the same purposes.
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that the funds are collected directly by the government to (partially)
cover the cost of the bailout.
IV. MARKET ADAPTIONS TO AN EXTENDED LIABILITY REGIME
Having laid the foundations of our proposed extended liability rule in
the previous section, in this Part, we explain how the market would adjust
to the new liability rule, in particular by focusing on: (1) how the risks of
incurring extended liability for SIFI failures would be shifted to insurance
companies and derivative counterparties because insurance and derivative
products would emerge to shoulder the risk of such extended liability in
exchange for compensation for doing so; (2) how our rule is going to affect
the composition of SIFIs’ shareholder base; and (3) how our liability rule
would ameliorate the problem of firms being too big to manage.
A. Insurance Markets for Extended Liability Exposure
In his provocative article advocating for an unlimited liability regime
for SIFIs’ shareholders, Conti-Brown argued that the “greatest feature”
of this regime is that it would result in the creation of a new form of
derivative instrument that would effectively shift the risk of unlimited
liability from shareholders to derivative counterparties.134 Specifically,
Conti-Brown envisages the introduction of a particular derivative—the
shareholder liability swap (SLS)—that would work, much like a credit
default swap (CDS), as follows:
The issuer would guarantee to pay the holder of equity . . . enough
to cover any losses following a taxpayer bailout. In this sense, an SLS
is similar to a credit default swap (CDS), which pays a bondholder
the value of a bond in the event the issuer of the bond defaults.135

The advantage of a SLS would be twofold. First, the value of the SLS
would serve as a signal of the solvency of the institution. Currently, the
two most accredited indicators of a firm solvency are the ratings issued
by credit rating agencies (CRAs) and CDSs. CRAs tend to react to
mutated circumstances at a much slower speed than the market.136
CDSs, in turn, are insensitive to the risk of a bailout because a bailout
usually prevents a default; in other words, CDSs, unlike SLSs,
underestimate the solvency risk of too-big-to-fail SIFIs. Building on
this, Conti-Brown argues that variations in the price of SLS would serve
134. Conti-Brown, supra note 9, at 439.
135. Id.
136. Mark J. Flannery, Joel F. Houston & Frank Partnoy, Credit Default Swap Spreads
as Viable Substitutes for Credit Ratings, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2085, 2106 (2010).
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as a useful tool to “determine the likelihood of a government
bailout.”137 Second, shareholders could distribute the risk posed by the
default of their SIFI by buying SLS from agents that are in a better
position to bear that risk.
The extended liability regime that we propose improves on this
important ancillary element of Conti-Brown’s proposal. The price of a
SLS under Conti-Brown’s unlimited liability rule would not depend only
on the likelihood of a default, but also on the estimated value of the
liability given default. The latter, however, is the result of the idiosyncratic
political reaction to a situation of crisis and hence is hard to estimate for
market participants. To put it differently, the probability of default of an
institution is a risk (i.e., a form of “randomness whose probabilistic nature
is extremely familiar and can be characterized with objective
probabilities”138), whereas the cost of a SIFI bailout and hence the extent
of the expected liability, is uncertain (i.e., characterized by “randomness
whose probabilistic behavior is extremely unfamiliar, unknown, or even
unknowable”139). Thus, the price of a derivative that accounts for the
estimated value of the liability given default is bound to be an extremely
noisy signal of the probability of SIFI default. Similarly, because it would
be based on an event characterized by uncertainty, the SLS would be a
poor mechanism to distribute risk in the market.140

137. Conti-Brown, supra note 9, at 439.
138. Eric L. Talley, On Uncertainty, Ambiguity, and Contractual Conditions, 34 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 755, 759 (2009).
139. Id.
140. Neil A. Doherty & Alexander Muermann, On the Role of Insurance Brokers in
Resolving the Known, the Unknown, and the Unknowable, in THE KNOWN, THE UNKNOWN,
AND THE UNKNOWABLE IN FINANCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT: MEASUREMENT AND THEORY
ADVANCING PRACTICE 194, 194 (Francis X. Diebold, Neil A. Doherty & Richard J.
Herring eds. 2010). As Doherty and Muermann stated:
Insurance [in this case, the SLS] transfers risk, and the knowledge of the level
of risk is important to the parties in deciding whether to engage in this activity.
Without knowledge of the underlying loss distribution, the insurer [i.e. the
buyer of the SLS] will find it difficult to set a price and the policyholder [i.e.
the shareholder] is unable to tell whether he is getting a good price from the
insurer.
Id.; see also Michael Simkovic, Limited Liability and the Known Unknown, 68 DUKE L.J. 275,
309 (2018) (“Insurers generally prefer to underwrite insurance for well-understood,
specific, and readily quantifiable risks for which historical data is available−that is, risks
that resemble those that have materialized in the past.”). In this case, markets would
be much more familiar with estimating the probability of default of an institution than
with predicting policymakers’ reactions to a financial crisis.
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On the contrary, under our proposed extended liability regime, the
value of a SLS would depend only on the probability of default because
the amount of liability is clearly defined ex ante. Therefore, under our
rule, the SLS would be more effective at distributing risk and would
constitute a more reliable and transparent signal of a SIFI’s solvency.
Moreover, under a liability regime like the one we propose, an
insurance market and/or a derivatives market for shifting extended liability
risk would be highly likely to emerge. Such markets would have structural
characteristics similar to those of the robust municipal bond insurance
market or the CDS market that currently exist.141 Were such markets to
develop, then either the SIFI would contract and pay for insurance that
would pay out the additional money owed by investors in case of default or
individual investors could buy their own policies or derivative contracts.
Moreover, as with municipal bond insurance, once an investor’s
extended liability is insured, the performance of the SIFI will be closely
monitored by its insurer through a process known as “surveillance” in
the municipal bond context.142 The insurance company would be
specialized in monitoring SIFIs’ behavior and therefore in a good
position to identify excessively risky conducts. SIFIs would therefore be
penalized for engaging in excessively risky activities because their
insurance premiums would go up. Further, the regulator itself would
have an additional market signal to act upon before it is too late.

141. Under our proposal, insurance companies would have a contractual obligation
to pay claims to shareholders/policyholders if a default or bailout of a SIFI triggered
an extended liability payment. Where the insurance for SIFI default would pay the
extended liability obligations of SIFI shareholders, similar to municipal bond
insurance companies when municipalities default on their obligations to pay principal
and interest on their outstanding bonds. What Does Municipal Bond Insurance Cover?,
MORNINGSTAR (2015), http://news.morningstar.com/classroom2/course.asp?docId=
5399&page=3 [https://perma.cc/LF7N-3L6S]. In particular, when a municipality
defaults on its debt, the municipal bond insurance company becomes obligated to
make the requisite principal and interest payments to investors in a timely fashion. Id.
Insurance companies usually insure only municipal bonds with credit ratings of BBB
or higher. Id. Insurance policies also are available for municipal bond funds. Id.
142. See How Municipal Bonds Are Insured?, MORNINGSTAR (2015), http://news.
morningstar.com/classroom2/course.asp?docId=5399&page=4&CN=sample
[https://perma.cc/BFP7-4EW4].
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B. Extended Liability and SIFIs’ Ownership
In general, by increasing the liability faced by the shareholders, our
proposed rule increases the incentives of market participants to
engage in monitoring.143 However, it is important to understand in
greater detail how our proposal would affect asset managers, given
their key role in today’s equity market. The first question to address is:
who should be liable? The funds that hold the shares (e.g., Fidelity
Magellan Fund), the advisor that manages the funds (e.g., Fidelity), or
both? We suggest that the advisor and the funds should be held jointly
liable. The reason is that the former has the skills and the competences
to engage in monitoring, whereas the latter has the resources to cover
the liability. If the liability were placed only on asset managers, then
they would be incentivized to hold less assets, thus potentially creating
a judgment-proof problem. At the same time, funds themselves do not
have the resources and the expertise that are necessary to monitor
their portfolio firms. In this vein, making them liable might produce
limited benefits in terms of increased monitoring.
But how would this liability rule change the incentives of asset
managers? To answer this question, leaving aside the problem of how
to transition to the new regime,144 one must consider that under our
extended liability regime, the price of SIFI shares will be affected by
exactly the same factors that are influencing prices in its absence, but
with one significant exception: changes in the stability of the SIFI will
have a larger impact on share prices. In this vein, investors that have
the ability to monitor their portfolio companies and more specifically
to influence their management so as to prevent excessive risk-taking
will find SIFI shares attractive. In fact, by increasing the safety and
soundness of the SIFIs they invest in, such investors could reduce
insurance premiums and ultimately increase share prices.
Of course, we recognize that not all shareholders are equally well
equipped to engage in the monitoring of SIFIs. Indeed, we believe that
there will be vast heterogeneity among the potential shareholding
population with respect to their monitoring capabilities. In particular,
under our proposal, passivity will be riskier for investors (including but
not limited to those who invest in index funds as well as professionally
managed mutual funds that have made a determination to remain
143. If an SLS market emerges, such monitoring will be conducted by the swap
counterparties. If no SLS or insurance market emerges, then the investors who face
extended liability will have the incentive to monitor.
144. See infra Section V.C.
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passive). We believe that this increased risk is actually an attractive
feature of our extended liability proposal for two reasons. First, as
noted in the previous section, the existence of derivatives and the
emergence of private insurance coverage for extended liability will
shift most, and possibly all, of the risk of our proposal onto derivative
and insurance company counterparties. This risk-shifting will
ameliorate the risk to passive investors that hold stock in SIFIs directly
or through mutual funds, or investors that otherwise choose to remain
rationally ignorant and passive about the levels of risk-taking actually
going on within particular financial institutions. However, we recognize
that under our proposal, investors would still experience extended
liability for SIFI losses if the SIFIs in which they invested failed and their
insurers and/or derivative counterparties also failed. Because of this risk,
we acknowledge that our proposal would make investing in SIFIs less
attractive for passive investors. But at the same time, it would make
investing in SIFIs more attractive for active, sophisticated investors
because it would increase the expected returns associated with locating
arbitrage opportunities in SIFIs that are less risky than they are
perceived to be in the market. The added risk of incremental liability
from our proposal would have the effect of magnifying the available
arbitrage opportunities beyond what they would be under the current
system of limited liability and anticipated government bailouts.
C. Too Big to Manage
According to many commentators, large banks are not only too big to
fail but also too big to manage.145 The basic argument is that it is very hard
for executives, boards, and shareholders to oversee large banks with
hundreds of thousands of employees.146 The main issue is that the
activities of banks, and especially of the largest institutions, are incredibly
complex and opaque.147 Therefore, even assuming that they have the best
intentions, managers and shareholders might not be able to manage a
145. See generally Jeremy C. Kress, Solving Banking’s ‘Too Big to Manage’ Problem, 104
MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (arguing that the most prominent proposals to
reduce the size of banks all suffer from shortcomings).
146. See Julian Birkinshaw & Suzanne Heywood, Too Big to Manage?, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 26, 2009).
147. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, Bank Corporate Governance: A
Proposal for the Post-Crisis World, 22 FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 85, 90 (2016)
(noting that “[t]he opacity of bank activities, combined with the complexity of risk
management activities involving the valuation and control of complex asset positions,
creates significant monitoring difficulties”).
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SIFI’s risk exposure.148 The problem significantly worsens when one
considers that managers’ incentives are further skewed toward risk-taking
by the typical compensation contracts in the banking sector.149
Against this background, one could argue that shareholders would
have incentives to push toward shrinking the size of their SIFI in order
to minimize the risk of losses. However, as noted in Section II.A, SIFIs’
shareholders enjoy an implicit subsidy, which protects them from
possible losses because their firm is too big to fail. Thus, they have no
incentives to break up their SIFI, despite the fact that this would
facilitate their monitoring. Our liability rule would address this
problem as well. By increasing shareholder exposure to downside risk,
our proposal gives shareholders stronger incentives to ensure that the
SIFI becomes of the “optimal” size. That is, sufficiently big to enjoy the
relevant economies of scale that are associated with high volumes of
activity but also not so large that it becomes impossible to monitor.
V. WHY STANDARD OBJECTIONS TO UNLIMITED LIABILITY DO NOT
APPLY
Since Hansmann and Kraakman’s seminal article,150 any proposal to
extend shareholder liability must wrestle with five standard objections: (1)
firms would just finance themselves through debt instead of equity; (2)
shareholders do not have the ability to monitor; (3) an extended liability
rule would result in shares being held by judgment proof shareholders; (4)
it is hard to collect from offshore investors; and (5) it is hard to define when
the liability attaches. We have already dealt with points (1) and (5) in
Section III.A. The fourth objection loses most of its bite in the face of the
explosion of international arbitration. Here, we also show that the second
and third objections are, respectively, no longer valid following the
reconcentration of ownership in the hands of institutional investors that
has taken place in the last thirty years and is easy to address. Moreover, it is
important to remark that extending liability will impose a loss on the
existing shareholders. And while it is appropriate that the cost of equity
incorporates the risk posed by the firm,151 it is still desirable to compensate
shareholders that hold shares during the transition period. We discuss how
this compensation can be carried out in Section V.C.
148. Kress, supra note 145, at 17.
149. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J.
247, 255 (2010) (discussing bankers’ incentives to take excessive risks).
150. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 18.
151. Id. at 1903.
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A. Shareholders’ Monitoring
One of the most convincing arguments against unlimited liability is
that shareholders would not be able to effectively monitor the behavior
of their firm independently from the amount of liability to which they
are exposed simply because they lack the required competences.152
However, such an argument has lost most of its bite due to the
transition from the Berle-Means corporation, characterized by diffuse
ownership, to present-day institutional ownership.153 In fact, unlike
small retail shareholders, large and sophisticated institutional
investors, such as Fidelity, Capital Research, and T. Rowe Price, have
the resources and the know-how to monitor management provided
that they are given sufficient incentives to do so.154
A related critique of unlimited liability is that an investor would have
to monitor the wealth of other shareholders because if the latter is
insolvent, the investor would be exposed to higher liability.155 However,
152. This argument was frequently embraced by judges that were concerned with
the unfairness of assigning a large liability to shareholders who are not in the “capacity
to control” or influence the decisions of the management. See Schwarcz, supra note 61, at
9. For an early formulation of this view, see Spear v. Grant, 16 Mass. 9, 14 (1819) (“[I]f [a
stockholder] were equally liable to each holder of the notes (which he must be if liable at
all; for if the facts agreed create a promise to one, they create a promise to all), then the
most palpable injustice would take place. For a stockholder, wholly innocent and ignorant
of the mismanagement, which has brought the bank into discredit, might be ruined by
reason of owning a single share in the stock of the corporation.”).
153. At the time of the debate sparked by Hansmann and Kraakman’s article,
Grundfest noted that “[r]elatively few institutions hold as much as one percent of any
issuer’s shares.” Grundfest, supra note 125, at 396. Instead, large institutional investors
hold a much higher stake in many corporations. See, e.g., Jan Fichtner, Eelke M.
Heemskerk & Javier Garcia-Bernardo, Hidden Power of the Big Three? Passive Index Funds,
Re-Concentration of Corporate Ownership, and New Financial Risk, 19 BUS. & POL. 298, 312
(2017) (showing that Fidelity, Capital Research, and T. Rowe Price, some of the largest
U.S. active managers, as of March 2016, held stakes higher than five percent in 1309,
528, and 399 companies across the world, respectively).
154. See Sean J. Griffith, Opt-In Stewardship: Toward an Optimal Delegation of Mutual
Fund Voting Authority, 98 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (noting that institutional
investors “know what information to ask for. They know what it means. And they hold
sufficiently large stakes to care”).
155. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation,
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 95 (1985) (“[L]imited liability reduces the costs of monitoring
other shareholders. Under a rule exposing equity investors to additional liability, the
greater the wealth of other shareholders, the lower the probability that any one
shareholder’s assets will be needed to pay a judgment. Thus existing shareholders
would have incentives to engage in costly monitoring of other shareholders to ensure
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this problem only arises if shareholders are jointly liable,156 whereas
under our rule, each shareholder can only be asked to pay in accordance
to the formula described in Section III.A. Therefore, the expected
liability of one shareholder is not affected by the wealth of the other.
B. Judgment Proof
The key argument behind the idea of unlimited liability is that it will
induce shareholders to monitor the firm more carefully and will lower
stock prices to reflect the expected value of liability.157 Yet, increasing
shareholders’ liability cannot have these effects if the shareholders are
judgment proof. At the extreme, a shareholder that has invested all her
assets in a corporation will be indifferent between an unlimited liability
rule and the current regime of limited liability. While it is extremely
unlikely that the judgment-proof problem affecting shareholders is this
severe, the key idea that high levels of liability cannot influence the
behavior of shallow-pocket shareholders remains. However, this problem
would be significantly less severe under our rule than under unlimited
liability, especially given the current ownership structure of SIFIs.
In particular, under this rule the maximum liability would be twice the
shareholder’s investment (when DRS = 1). It is implausible that investors
are undiversified to the point of placing more than half of their assets in a
single SIFI. Nowadays, the vast majority of the shares are held by large
institutional investors. Our proposed extended liability rule will not
bankrupt these investors because they can hedge this risk via a SLS.158
In any event, because the liability cap is clearly spelled out ex ante, it
is easy to prevent deep-pocketed investors from passing their shares to
shallow-pocket ones before liability is triggered. Assume that there are
two individuals, A and B, and that A is a deep-pocketed shareholder,
whereas B owns no assets. A might have incentives to park A’s shares with
B in order to escape liability. The following rule may prevent this
outcome. If B reports the scheme, A will have to pay treble damages,
that they do not transfer assets to others or sell to others with less wealth. Limited
liability makes the identity of other shareholders irrelevant and thus avoids these
costs.”).
156. David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
1565, 1578 (1991).
157. Grundfest, supra note 125, at 389 (explaining that unlimited liability can only
be effective if it “will cause stock prices to decline in a manner rationally related to the
business risks and capital adequacy, including insurance, of the underlying
enterprise”).
158. See, e.g., Fichtner, Heemskerk & Garcia-Bernardo, supra note 153, at 304.
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two-thirds of which will go to B. Let us return to the example presented
in the introduction in which the expected liability equals $160. If B
reports the scheme, A will be required to pay $480, of which B will
pocket $320. The optimal strategy for B would then be accepting to
hold A’s shares and then report A. Thus, A will have no incentives to
transfer shares to B in the first place.
One obvious problem is that it would be possible to create limited
liability companies with limited assets to hold SIFI shares.159 To prevent
this, it is important that these companies’ corporate veils can be pierced,
but only up to a value sufficient to cover the liability obligation of the
shareholders that derive from the default of a SIFI. In other words,
assume that Apple owns shares in JP Morgan Chase. To avoid liability,
Apple might create a company with limited assets—call it Rotten
Apple—to which it could contribute its JP Morgan Chase’s shares. While
for any other liability we argue that the standard veil-piercing doctrines
should apply to Rotten Apple, for the liability associated with JP
Morgan Chase’s default, the veil should automatically be pierced so
that Apple is liable.
C. Transitioning to the New Regime: Compensating Existing SIFI
Shareholders
Implementing the proposed reform might create a transition problem.
Specifically, if a law were passed imposing extended liability, anyone
holding shares in a SIFI at the time it entered into force would experience
a sudden decline in share value as share prices adjusted to reflect the new,
greater risk associated with owning shares in SIFIs. And while the very
purpose of increasing the liability faced by shareholders is to ensure that
the equity price adequately accounts for the risk posed by the
corporation,160 it might be problematic to impose losses on shareholders
that purchased the shares when the rule of the game was limited liability.
A possible solution would be compensating shareholders for the loss
caused by the increased liability. In the U.S. context, shareholders could
be compensated from payments from the FDIC deposit insurance fund.
While compensating shareholders for the transition from limited
liability to extended liability seems desirable, it is important to carefully
consider how to define the quantum of the compensation. For instance,
if the compensation is determined ex ante by the regulator based on
an estimation of the price drop, then it is bound to be inaccurate and
159. Conti-Brown, supra note 9, at 434.
160. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 18, at 1903.
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arbitrary. At the same time, calculating compensation based on the
observed price drop between pre-liability (say, tpre) and post-liability
(say, tpost) would also be problematic. First, it is hard to identify tpre.
Because investors will foresee that the liability rule will change, the
stock prices will begin to drop even before the law is enacted. Second,
basing compensation on the observed price drop would incentivize
shareholders to take on excessive risk during the transition period. In
fact, if the shareholders bet strong on risky projects and these projects
prove to be successful, the stock price of their company will increase,
and they will benefit. Instead, if these risky projects fail, the
shareholders would be able to externalize the losses to the FDIC.
Simply put, the shareholders would be able to play a “heads I win; tails
[the FDIC] loses” game.161 Third, the riskiest SIFIs will face a larger
price drop, and paradoxically, under this rule, their shareholders
would also be the ones that receive the largest compensation.
A way out of this impasse would be structuring a mechanism akin to
an auction among SIFIs. Contrary to normal auctions, we suggest a
mechanism of descending prices. In our context, the auction would
work as follows: first, the regulator imposes a ceiling for the
compensation, say 10 percent of the market value of a SIFI before the
rule was first discussed. This ceiling is likely to be inaccurate for the
reasons highlighted above. Yet, because it is only needed to start the
auction, its accuracy is less important. At this point, the shareholders
of each SIFI will be asked to state the lowest percentage of the ceiling
that they would be willing to accept. The compensation will then be set
at the percentage offered by the SIFI that wins the auction (i.e., that
offered the lowest percentage). To incentivize SIFIs to offer low
percentages, the winner of the auction could be awarded an additional
compensation, say 50 percent more than the percentage offered. To
exemplify, assume that there are three SIFIs: Bank of America, JP
Morgan Chase, and Goldman Sachs. Assume also that Bank of America
offers to accept 50 percent of the ceiling, JP Morgan Chase 30 percent,
and Goldman Sachs 10 percent. The compensation received by the
three SIFIs will be 10 percent of the ceiling because it was the lowest
bid. However, Goldman Sachs would receive 15 percent of the ceiling.
In addition to solving the problem of determining the price drop,
this mechanism would have an important advantage. As noted above,
161. Jonathan R. Macey, The Limited Liability Company: Lessons for Corporate Law, 73
WASH. U. L.Q. 433, 448 (1995) (formulating a similar claim with respect to limited
liability in general).
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the new liability rule will have a lower impact on the share price of safer
SIFIs. For this reason, the safest SIFI would be more likely to place the
winning bid and receive the added compensation.
CONCLUSION
The dramatic consequences of the last financial crisis are a painful
reminder of why we should prevent SIFIs from taking on excessive risk.
However, the complexity and the size of these financial giants make it
impossible for policymakers to craft regulations that can effectively
constrain SIFIs’ risk-taking. For this reason, this Article suggests that
policymakers should also directly tackle the incentives of their
shareholders and reduce their risk propensity.
We have argued that policymakers can achieve this goal by
abandoning the current rule limiting the liability of SIFI shareholders
to the amount of their investment, thus increasing SIFIs’ shareholder
exposure to downside risk. In itself, this proposal is only partly new, since
for three quarters of a century, roughly between the Civil War and the
Great Depression, the shareholders of U.S. banks were subject to double
liability. The characteristics of present-day financial markets—the
presence of capital ratios for financial institutions, the dominance of
institutional share ownership, and the availability of well-developed
insurance and derivatives markets—create the perfect conditions for
implementing a modified version of the traditional double liability rule.
More precisely, we propose that SIFI shareholders face extended liability,
up to twice the average share price in a twelve-month period prior to the
SIFI’s default or bailout, depending on the SIFI’s systemic relevance. This
would strengthen shareholders’ incentives to monitor SIFIs and prevent
them from engaging in excessively risky, socially harmful conducts.

